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DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON, PRESENTER:  Dr. Richard Shapcott is the senior lecturer in International 
Relations at the University of Queensland.   His areas of interest in research concern 
international ethics, cosmopolitan political theory and cultural diversity.  He is the 
author of the recently published book titled International Ethics: A Critical Introduction; 
and several other pieces, such as, “Anti-Cosmopolitanism, the Cosmopolitan Harm 
Principle and Global Dialogue,” in Michalis’ and Petito’s book, Civilizational Dialogue 
and World Order.  He’s also the author of “Dialogue and International Ethics: Religion, 
Cultural Diversity and Universalism, in Patrick Hayden’s, The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Ethics and International Relations.   
 
This interview will discuss the role of democracy in political, cosmopolitan ethics.  It was 
recorded during a lunch at the Customs House in Brisbane, a historically significant 
heritage building, with pleasing stone façades, and a grand view of the Brisbane River. 
 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Given the attention paid to moral pluralism in international ethics, would 
you argue that “there are certain rudimentary human universals,” in the words of 
Donald Brown, “that can be identified to help shape international projects”? 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Yes and no, I guess is my answer to that one.  I’m not exactly sure how 
Donald Brown means that, but it’s very clear that there are certain basic physical 
universals that as human beings we need to survive.  In order to survive, we need food 
and shelter; a fair bit of social interaction and that sort of things.  There are very clear 
physical universals that the human body requires as any other animal requires.  It is 
enough to think that our psyche requires social interaction and no man is an island.  
And so having a community of some sort, whether it be a family or a wider community, 
is a very important part of who we are.  So if we’re talking about human universals in 
terms of the things that characterize us all as human beings, that’s certainly the case.   
 
Beyond that, if we’re talking about universals that we all might agree upon, that’s not a 
resolved question and I hold out the hope that we may be – or that we are in principal, 
capable of agreeing on some things. That’s still an open question so i wouldn’t certainly 
go so far saying there are already identifiable areas of moral agreement.  I think that’s 
always too easy to assume.   
 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  If we did assume that there are these areas of moral ethics that could be 
universal to humanity, how could we identify those?  Do we have to depend on 
heuristic methods?  Or could we approach this question through empirical devises or is 
that beyond the mere capacities of one person? 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:   My view of this is that it’s not a matter of identifying preexisting ones; it’s 
a matter of working towards making new ones or making shared agreements. I see 
them socially constructed, in the jargon.  That is, they are a product of human beings’ 
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minds and facility for language. Therefore any universals we want to have in thoughts, 
we would need to in a sense, create them.   
 
There’s a nice quote that Chris Brown uses from Richard Rorty about ethics being, and 
communities being, “shaped rather than found.”  And I think that’s a nice way to think 
about it; that we are in a position where we have an ongoing challenge to shape these 
universals, rather than to identify them.  But that doesn’t mean we can’t, of course, 
engage in dialogue with everybody, so to speak, to seek to understand where we are. 
So that’s the first stage. Rather than of empirically identifying basic shared norms, the 
real question is how we interpret those norms and how – in order to identify what 
people believe, we need to engage in dialogue with each other about this.  And so 
there’s a great deal of merit, indeed it is necessary to engage in dialogue with different 
ethical and moral traditions and communities to understand each other.  And that’s the 
basis, as I see it, of any genuine moral universalism we may create.  We may identify 
things that we have in common, we may identify the ways we interpret thing 
differently, and we have to ask question, can we build something new?  Can we come to 
share some new understandings?   
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Excellent.  Would you argue that there is a balance between general laws 
and the relative context they’re being observed in?  Should this always help our efforts 
to help outsiders or even compatriots? 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Well, a concept that appeals to me very much is the Aristotelian concept 
of phronesis which is employed by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his account of Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, which I draw upon a lot.  Aristotle’s claim and Gadamer’s claim is that in 
ethical thinking, that is what we are always doing.  It’s the back and forward between 
universal ideas, principles, instances and circumstances.  So in that sense, I think that’s 
the essence of ethical reasoning, and that applies to all instances of it.  Or rather, that’s 
the most desirable way to think about what we’re doing rather than to simply derive 
empirical rules or universal rules that we simply than apply to all cases.  That we need 
to constantly be aware of context, and how context transforms and feedbacks on the 
universal. In that sense, that question speaks to my understanding of that concept of 
phronesis. 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Let’s move on to focusing more on cosmopolitanism.  How can anti-
cosmopolitanism maintain the theory of a nation when that concept is increasingly 
more difficult to define, specifically due to the effects of modern migration and the 
diversification of citizenries?   
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Well, I think that they try to – well, not all anti-cosmopolitans use the idea 
of nation or nationhood.  Some have other kinds of allegiances to community.  I think 
it’s a very important question.  Yah, I guess as always for us academics, it depends on 
what you mean by the nation.   And my sense is that they can do it partly because that’s 
the language and the belief system that most of the world continues to operate in.  Of 
course, there are many – it’s much more problematic than it used to be.  There are a lot 
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more other claims to sub-national identity or more fractured national identity.  But 
most people, many people still continue to live and work understanding themselves as 
being members of nations and that’s a very powerful idea that, despite migration and 
globalization, continues to hold quite a powerful grip on human imagination and 
political community.   So while it is being a little more fractured, it is still there.  So 
that’s the first part of the answer: they can do that because it’s how people live their 
lives.  And this becomes clearer when you start to ask questions about how we should 
treat outsiders.  That’s when those distinctions really come up and when people start to 
make that distinction.  And that’s when the ethical content of nationalism becomes 
emergent. 
 
I think on the other hand, that they can also, for the part of the national/anti-
cosmopolitan claim is not simply an empirical claim about what people do but also 
about how we ought to live.  And in that case, though you’ve got a perfectly reasonable 
case to say well, this nation has formed and has performed a useful role in giving people 
a strong sense of identity and belonging, in a world of conflict and change and those 
sorts of thing.  So there’s a normative claim of defense of the nation in one form or 
another that has quite a lot of merit to it.   
 
I mean, it’s not so much the contemporary transformations of political life, you know, 
we in Australia are lucky in many ways to live in a country that is what they call, a settler 
society.  And we are not as beholden by history when it comes to our concept of our 
identity.  So Australia, the United States, and Canada have a tradition of incorporating 
new arrivals in them all the time.  It’s sometimes contested and sometimes not so 
friendly and people are selective and what not, but there is that sense that we don’t 
have that ethnic concept of the nation in the same way that older European societies 
may have.  And that provides us with the capacity to reimagine our nation along 
different lines.   
 
But the really interesting thing for me about anti-cosmopolitanism and their conception 
of the nation is (I’m thinking of someone like David Miller who doesn’t seem to 
incorporate the historical theories of nationalism) of how it is we come to live in 
nations.  They take the nation for granted, as some sort of political community.  
Because they want to defend it, they want to defend certain achievements of it.  And I 
think that’s problematic for them.  Because if they don’t understand that the nation is a 
historically formed community that you know, a thousand years ago, nobody lived in 
nations as we understand them.  Then that raises the question about the future of the 
nation and its defensibility; and asks us to at least examine the possibility that nations 
are changing and may be becoming something else. 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  We’re now just going to be discussing democracy and cosmopolitanism, 
specifically this idea of a basic democracy which ties into questions asked before about 
basic and perhaps universal parameters for all humanity.  It might be something tied in 
to perhaps the id, to those social formations you spoke of earlier.  But before we do 
that, it’s quite important for us to know how you conceptualize democracy? 
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DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  How I conceptualize democracy?  I guess, not having given a lot of 
thought to democracy per se, my thinking has mostly been concerned with dialogue and 
cosmopolitanism.  So I guess in so far as I think about the dialogical aspects of 
democracy that I think are ethnically important ones.  Democracy serves many 
important functions in society.  It’s a way of resolving interest, conflicts of interests, and 
allowing, managing complex societies to work, and work through issues.  And, I guess, 
from my perspective, I like to think of democracy as being the chief advantage. The 
advantage of democracy is that it provides the way forward for including everybody in 
the rules that govern them.  And that sort of Habermasian/Kantian type approach is 
where I come from. 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Excellent. 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  It doesn’t have to take a particular institutional form, in one sense.   
Though it does have to have certain basic criteria that everybody be, in principal able to 
participate, where no one is excluded, or by virtue of any arbitrary criteria that’s not 
morally relevant.  I want to exclude psychopaths. [laughter] But we don’t want to 
exclude any particular religious group or any racial group or gender or anything like 
that.  
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  If we suppose that something like this next question exists, I’m very 
interested in going through a thought experiment with you. The theory of basic 
democracy argues that the democracy from which all democratic typologies or styles or 
different theories stem in institutionally practiced, historically seen and supposed for 
the future, is based upon a universal structure, observable in any polity, regardless of its 
ethnicity, race or government.  This point is supported by an argument called the 
archaeo-anthropologic argument: that democracy has been practiced through very 
rudimentary institutions such as communication, notions of equality and normative 
values that define its laws and implicit understanding of who are the leaders during the 
Mesolithic and Neolithic periods, 46000 years ago.  Should this statement be true, what 
implications would this have ethically now? 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Well, my first response is none.  In the sense that – I don’t’ want to go too 
far with this argument – but there is merit to the idea that you can’t derive an ‘ought’ 
from an ‘is’ in that sense.  That argument has been contested and the exact relationship 
between them is more problematic than that argument suggests.  But my point is that, 
what matters is how we think about it, and how we talk about, and what significance 
we give to it rather than whether or not it does exist empirically.  Just because human 
beings may have demonstrated a capacity for X or Y, doesn’t mean that it’s a good thing 
or a desirable thing.  It might mean that some things are more possible than others but 
it doesn’t in itself, necessarily lead us to any particular, ethical conclusions.   
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Right. 
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DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Human beings have been engaged in warfare and violence and altruism 
and all sorts of things for millennia.  That’s part of who we are.  So if questions we have 
to deal with, as ethics deal with, are what do we do, how do we act?  So if such a 
structure were identifiable, through some questions about the possibility of these sort 
of claims, to be able to objectively do that, were reasonably persuasive, the question is, 
“Well, okay, some people might say that is the case but, you know, since then, we’ve 
had other messages from God or told us how to live or we have learnt other things that 
tell us X or Y is a better form of society.”  Or as my limited understanding of the Marxist 
tradition suggest, you know, these were simpler societies.  They were communist, 
pluralist societies and it’s easier to do.  We live in much more complex societies with a 
division of labour and class structures and what not.  And this makes it harder for us – 
or rather, this would make it necessarily less appropriate perhaps for these societies, or 
less possible for these societies.   
 
So in itself, being able to identify anything like that is fascinating and interesting but it 
does not necessarily lead us to any conclusion about the value or not of democracy.  
That’s a question we have to work out for ourselves.  Why do we value it?  What do we 
value about it?  And so my argument would be that if we wanted to recognize that 
democracy is valuable for a number of reasons, this is where the usual distinctions start 
to collapse because it tends to account for certain properties which human beings 
possess.  That we can identify but also which we can value and which in the frameworks 
– moral frameworks that we live in make more sense, in the sense that it’s fairly hard to 
argue that most people don’t have some sort of moral sense; some sort of capacity for 
agency; some capacity to make choices between right and wrong whenever they make 
a decision; some capacity for control over their own lives, whether or not we go all the 
way with Kant on that for agency or rationality, is another question or what not, but I 
think it’s fairly hard to deny that these days unless you have some sort of ideological 
commitment against that.  There are some other overriding factors that you may want 
to invoke, but they’re fairly hard to invoke these days. 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Very interesting, thank you for that.  We’re nearly at the back end of our 
interview.  I suppose this question should go rather easily.  If we were to remove 
democratic theory from the ownership of western ideology and giving it to a 
cosmopolitan, universalist one, are we changing the ethics of democratization? 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Are we changing the ethics?  Well, it depends on how you understand 
democratization.  
 
If by that you mean that democracy now becomes some common heritage of 
humankind, and that people all over the world interpret democracy in different ways 
then yes, it’s not necessarily up to us how people interpret democracy. But if you allow 
for different ways of being in the democratic sprit, then, of course, yes, it changes 
democracy and democratization because it becomes in political terms less tied to 
certain institutional programs like representative democracy or voting or those types of 
questions.  There are other ways that democratic values can be perhaps achieved, and if 
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that’s what that question is directed at; it changes what we mean by democracy and in 
unforeseeable ways.  I think it’s fairly clear from the history of democracy it’s very 
changeable and robust an idea.  There have been many different forms of it. 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  It seems that at present, the current practice of applying a specific 
typology of democracy with its own institutions on a pluralist citizenry which may find 
those institutions inappropriate, perhaps the U.S.A’s attempt to transplant a version of 
liberal constitutional democracy in Iraq is a good example, is contrary to the harm 
principal.  Would you agree with this statement and why? 
 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  I would agree with that statement to the point on which it’s about 
imposition.  Imposition without consent is a violation of the ‘basic principle’ or in 
Kantian terms, violation of “categorical imperative,” but it’s a violation of the gist of 
what democracy is.  Democracy is about consent and an imposed political form of 
democracy implies a lack of consent.  So that is certainly reconcilable with a conception 
of the harm principle, with the human capacity for agency for making decisions, for 
choosing things. 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Does observing basic democracy in its citizenry and then using the data 
derived for measuring certain universal variables and then improving, adopting or 
constructing the necessary institutions, seem like a better alternative – perhaps  
something that might not be in the violation of the harm principle – an appropriate or 
inappropriate style of democracy? 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Well, by basic democracy you referring to that theory of basic democracy 
you referred to earlier?  Is that – 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Oh, yes.  It’s – we can scratch the basic democracy. 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  [laughs] Well, like I said before the language of that question is a bit 
problematic for me.  I would reinterpret that to say that any viable democracy, any 
viable political community has to be consistent with and come out of the values of the 
people that it’s there to serve and so if we identify democratic with dialogic practices in 
any particular communities then those perhaps should be encouraged and 
reformulated or dealt with, worked with, in order to achieve a more democratic result; 
a better outcome for the people involved.  But I have problems with the idea of 
empirically identifying democracy.  These are values, these aren’t facts. 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Perhaps our approach is too technocratic. 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  For my taking, for my liking, yeah.  I think technocratic results like that 
tend to within themselves open up to capacities for anti-democratic behavior.  Because 
you stand on some ground that says, “I have knowledge of you that’s better than you 
do.” “Because I’m a technocrat, I understand this better than you do and therefore I’m 
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going to apply it.”  That’s contrary to the spirit of dialogue and democracy which is 
about having an agreement about things. 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Fantastic.  Amartya Sen has argued that democracy is now a universal 
right.  I agree with this statement because I view democracy, or power without violence, 
and non-democracy, or power through violence, as two simple structures of socio-
political organization that we have perhaps designed through evolution. I feel that 
government without violence and government through violence are very old structures 
with late-modern morality pointing towards the necessity to have a government 
without violence.  Given this argument, what is your view of democracy as a universal 
right?  Does it have a place in cosmopolitanism? 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  That’s a very loaded question.  There are a lot of terms to deal with, to 
problematize before you can answer that.  First one is the language of rights and the 
capacity to speak on universal – of universalism in those terms; that’s an assumption.  
There’s an increasingly broad consensus that seems to be the language in which people 
talk about universalism.  It seems to have become a language that’s acceptable to many 
people, a language of rights, so there should be a right to democracy.  Let me just say 
that rights is only one language of cosmopolitanism.  And there are other ways.  Some 
people talk about obligations.  Some people talk about cosmopolitanism as an ethos 
rather than a particular political expression of it.   
 
From Sen’s quote I would suggest, yes, we can certainly think about the right of 
democratization because that is the right of consent.  That’s a principal of consent in 
regards to the matters of the political institutions that affect us.  So in that sense yes, if 
that’s what he means by democracy and that concept, that content, and that makes 
perfect sense to me.  That would seem to be the essence of something like Habermas’s 
or Andrews Linkalter’s conception of cosmopolitanism.   
 
Now the other part of the question was… 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Just if democracy, if it is a universal right, does it have a place in 
cosmopolitanism? 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Yes, well, of course, I think so.   The cosmopolitan version that I have is 
not just moral universalism but cosmopolitanism is derived from the principal of 
universal consent.   
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Okay. 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  And therefore some form of democratic right of association and 
participation, is involved in it.  And that belongs to everybody in relationship to 
everybody else.  Not just in relationship to your particular community that you inhabit, 
but rather to any community ultimately or any individual that affects you, or that you 
affect with your actions. 
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DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Fantastic.  I find that several terms we currently use in political discourse 
are not ethically sound.  
 
[Laughter] 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  One of them includes calling OECD countries, “democratized” and, or, 
“developed”, when realistically these states have a wide variety of democratically styled 
governments and are continually in the process of developing.  Should we reconsider 
the way we use these terms? 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  I see no problems with that.  It certainly seems to be from the outside, 
the United States seems to be a country that has problem with its democracy. It seems 
to have an arcane form of democracy and has been superseded by others, but it does 
not recognize that.  So I would – there would certainly be great use of reminding 
ourselves that democracy is an ongoing project and not a final or completed one.  So I 
can certainly see the political use of changing those terminologies.   
 
Of course, those terminologies extend from international institutions that are seeking to 
provide criteria for various activities and ways of classifying states and communities into 
particular forms; modeled upon a conception and an ideal type that they wish to or that 
they think that they embody.  And so it serves a certain function for them to do that.   
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  If a methodology could be conceived of what would permit a 
country to understand, in real time – and here we’re trying to bring in the technology of 
perhaps, communication between citizenry and the government.  If the government 
could understand in real time what its pluralist citizenry considered or considers to be 
equality, law, communication and the selection of officials – these broad ever-changing 
concepts, would that provide benefit to a government in power or to an opposition?  Is 
such a goal possible?  Will we ever be able to define, perhaps, a basic understanding of 
all the different conceptualizations that all of the different individuals have of these 
terms? 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Interesting question.  There is an implicit assumption in that question that 
it would be a good thing to have this capacity because it would allow our governments 
to, or politicians, to better represent and understand their population.  And that if 
somehow we knew that better we would be better respond to it.   
 
My concern with that proposal would be that if it’s a one way street, then it’s just a tool 
for further domination and manipulation.  That opens up the capacity for the states to – 
or perhaps differently in the light of common politics, current politics – it opens up the 
possibility of politics that’s purely responsive to public opinion on a minute by minute 
basis; that sort of hyper poll-driven politics.  And while, of course, we want our 
politicians to be responsive to us, that’s not necessarily clearly the best way of doing it.  
I don’t think it would be.  I can’t quite see the advantage of real time minute to minute 
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understanding things – 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Perhaps it would have more advantage in the intellectual world.   
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Well, it’s always good to know what people are thinking.  That’s a useful 
thing to have, and it’s good to know that people’s thoughts change over time and we 
just don’t see how they have changed.  But in the hands of government it becomes a – 
or any authority figure, corporations, whatever – it becomes a means. The first question 
is going to be: how are we going to manipulate this to get the ends we want? So it’s a 
one way street.  I’m much more interested in ways that we can … 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Mitigate the ill-effects of perhaps – 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Well, we can turn it into a two-way street. It’s a dialogical process. 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  That’s right. 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Where people have ongoing conversations about this, and mutually 
inform each other in this rather than just respond as if they were talking to Alan Jones 
on Sydney radio.  
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  [laughs] 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Or something like that. That’s always a danger.  These things should be a 
way to mutually inform each other.  One of the great problems we have is that our 
society is very poorly informed about things, and opinion and emotion count for too 
much in those arguments.  And much more better to have an informed population, I 
think. [laughs] 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Indeed, the perennial problem I think. 
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Of course.  Yes, indeed. 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  Well, again, thank you very much for answering the last question as well.  
A bit of a curve ball I wanted to throw at you.  
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:   [laughs] 
 
DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON:  And, yes, it really was our implicit intention with that question to sort of 
feel out whether this would be a good avenue to approach for the improvement of 
governance. Of whether it had ethical problems to it and that’s really the reason we 
wanted to push that in this interview.  Again, Dr. Shapcott, thank you very much for 
your time.   
 
DR. RICHARD SHAPCOTT:  Thank you.  Greatly appreciate it, most interesting. 
